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STATE INVESTMENT ATTRACTION SUBSIDY WARS
RESULTING FROM A PRISONER'S DILEMMA: THE
INADEQUACY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
SOLUTIONS AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
MATIHEW SCHAEFER*
INTRODUCTION
Every state constitution allows for government subsidies to attract new business
investment towards the state.' Therefore, state constitutions serve as catalysts for
economic development ... right? Wrong. Instead, state constitutions are serving as
catalysts for wasteful and/or distortive government subsidies. Yet, U.S. states
continue to engage in investment attraction subsidy wars because the states
(including their politicians and judges) find themselves in a "prisoner's dilemma."'
Indeed, many state constitutions contain provisions that arguably should limit the
ability of these states to grant subsidies for investment attraction purposes. Yet, as
a result of the prisoner's dilemma, these provisions have been interpreted to provide
little, if any, limits.
Each state would be better off if constraints were placed on all states regarding
the amount of investment attraction subsidies they could grant. However, because
states are unable to receive sufficient assurances that other states will not grant
investment attraction subsidies, they avoid the "heavy sentence" that would be
imposed upon them by maintaining, enacting or enforcing unilateral state
constitutional constraints. For the states, the heavy sentence may come in the form
of lost investment and employment and accompanying state revenue streams. For
individual politicians and judges, the sentence may come in the form of political
defeat.
Economic theory recognizes that subsidies are damaging to welfare unless they
are granted to correct for an externality or market failure. States often justify the
subsidies they grant to attract investments based on expected net increases in tax
revenues. In other words, certain attracted investments lead to greater social benefits
than the market accounts for and thus this externality must be corrected by granting
a subsidy. The argument is that attracted enterprises, particularly those that are large
companies, will pay certain taxes (even if the part of the incentives used to attract
the business are partial tax exemptions). Additionally, the attracted business'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, Nebraska. I would like
to thank Professor John Jackson, Georgetown University Law School, for his guidance throughout my S.J.D.
research. I would also like to thank Denise Davis, my research assistant, for her research help on this article and
the editors of the New Mexico Law Review, particularly Kimberly Richards.
I. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626 (N.C. 1996); Walter Hellerstein & Dan
T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraintson State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L REV. 789, 790
(1996); Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposalto ProhibitIndustrialRelocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L REV. 669, 670
(1994).
2. This is true for U.S. states as well as Canadian provinces. See James A. Brander, Economic Policy
Formation in a FederalState: A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 33, 41-42
(Richard Simeon ed., 1985); Michael J. Trebilcock & Rambod Behboodi, The CanadianAgreement on Internal
Trade: Retrospect and Prospects,in GETTING THERE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL TRADE

20, 55 (Michael J. Trebilcock & Daniel Schwanen eds., 1995); Taylor, supra note 1, at 693.
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employees will pay taxes, the attracted business may increase the income of existing
businesses that will pay additional taxes, and the attracted enterprise may attract
other enterprises that will locate in the state leading to further tax collections. So
what is wrong with creating a market among states for investment in which
subsidies are allowed as an element of the competition?
There exist two conflicting versions of the impact of state subsidies on
investment decisions of businesses. The first version is that state subsidies actually
do influence business decisions and that an attractive incentive package can actually
cause a business to invest in a state in which it otherwise would not have chosen to
place its investment.3 Under this version, the efficient allocation of resources is
being distorted leading to inefficiencies within the national economy unless the
subsidy corrects for an externality. However, if states are unlikely to measure
externalities properly, then welfare will still be reduced or at least not enhanced.
The second version is that state subsidies have no effect on investment decisions of
businesses.4 This second version may occur either because differences in competing
subsidy offers are not significant enough to overcome other factors that businesses
consider when making locational decisions or because competing bids by different
states will largely cancel one another out. Under this version, businesses base their
locational decisions on other factors and thus subsidies are unnecessary
"giveaways." Under either version, subsidy wars transfer much, or even all, of the
net social benefits to the attracted enterprise. Therefore, one does not need to select
between the two competing versions in order to conclude that state subsidy wars for
investment attraction should be curbed.
Are there any existing means to remove states from this prisoner's dilemma?
Several states have entered into informal regional agreements seeking to curb the
use of relocation incentives and the National Governors' Association passed a
policy resolution applicable to all states.5 However, these agreements and policies
lacked any enforcement mechanism and failed to remove states from the prisoner's
dilemma they face. The U.S. Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause may
prohibit certain types of state subsidies but it does not provide comprehensive
constraints. Additionally, the class of typical plaintiffs under the dormant
Commerce Clause may have insufficient incentives to seek enforcement of these
constraints. International trade agreements have matured to address subsidy
practices. Unfortunately, there is little in current agreements that will serve a
"supplementary constitutional function" by significantly limiting state subsidy wars
for investment attraction since the focus of these agreements is on international
distortions rather than distortions within a national economy. The international
agreements may also suffer from a lack of plaintiffs seeking enforcement of the
constraints against investment attraction subsidies.
The United States is not the only federation or vertically divided power system
seeking to restrain investment attraction subsidy wars among component units.
Indeed, other divided power systems have developed potential solutions to the

3. See infra Part l.B.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
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prisoner's dilemma confronting their component units of government. A
comparative examination of the weaknesses and strengths of the approaches of
these divided power systems as well as the weaknesses within the current U.S.
approach led to the conclusion that federal legislation is both necessary and
appropriate to solve the prisoner's dilemma causing state investment attraction
subsidy wars. Although there are many potential objections to such a solution, the
substantive constraints and enforcement mechanism adopted by the federal
legislation can be shaped to sharply reduce the force of these objections.
Part I of this article seeks to define the term subsidy and gives a typology of state
subsidies employed for investment attraction purposes. Part II explores the
economics and political economy of state investment attraction subsidy wars. It also
elaborates on the two competing versions of the effectiveness of state investment
attraction subsidies and analyzes the prisoner's dilemma that confronts the states,
as well as their politicians and judges. Part II examines potential state
constitutional constraints on investment attraction subsides. However, these
potential constraints have been significantly narrowed through interpretation by
state judges influenced by the prisoner's dilemma. Part IV examines other potential
U.S. domestic restraints on state investment attraction subsidies, including interstate
agreements and dormant Commerce Clause constraints. Part V analyzes potential
international constraints on state investment attraction subsidies. Part VI explores
approaches within Canada and the European Community that seek to minimize the
prisoner's dilemma that confronts their respective component units of government.
Part VII suggests an outline for a federal legislative solution to curb state
investment attraction subsidy wars and responds to possible critiques of the
proposed solution.
I. SUBSIDIES DEFINED AND A TYPOLOGY OF STATE SUBSIDIES FOR
INVESTMENT ATTRACTION
Beyond natural locational advantages, such as climate, land area, and proximity
to markets, states compete for investments utilizing three general methods:
1) Improving the quality of the overall business climate by, for instance,
improving the state educational system to produce an educated work force,
enhancing infrastructure within the state, maintaining or developing the stability of
the state's fiscal condition, and providing a predictable legislative and regulatory
environment;
2) Reducing the stringency of generally applicable regulations by, for example,
lowering corporate tax rates or (to the extent allowed by federal law) lowering
environmental or labor standards; and
3) Granting "subsidies."
Of course, what constitutes a "subsidy" is a definitional problem.6 This
definitional problem relates to the difficulty of establishing the so-called "neutral
baseline context for economic choices."'7 In the abstract, all governmental actions

6. See generally, JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 293-94 (2d ed., 1997); GARY C.
HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9-10 (1984).

7. Peter Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
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could be considered as distorting private economic choices. The relevant question
is what governmental actions should be included in the neutral baseline?
Correspondingly, what types of actions should be excluded from the neutral
baseline and thus considered subsidies? Should the neutral baseline only be
composed of natural locational advantages? Or should the neutral baseline include
generally applicable tax rates and regulations that differ among states? The listing
of methods above assumes that natural locational advantages as well as methods #1
and #2 should be considered as part of the neutral baseline. To exclude methods #1
and #2 from the neutral baseline would fail to recognize the benefits of regulatory
competition between states and that different territorial populations may have
different preferences! For instance, it would be contrary to the goals of a federal
system to consider a state is offering a subsidy that may need to be limited or counteracted in some fashion when it provides a strong educational system and lower tax
rates vis a vis other states. Indeed, a neutral baseline that excluded methods #1 and
#2 would cut at the very heart of federalism and lead to unnecessary pressures for
harmonization in state policies.9 Moreover, the neutral baseline selected above that
includes methods #1 and #2 comports with the conclusions of roundtable
discussions between state governors and business CEOs regarding the methods by
which states should compete for investment."0
The major types of subsidies employed by states for investment attraction
purposes include the following:"
1) Cash and land grants;
2) Tax credits, deductions and exemptions on a variety of taxes, including
income, sales, use, and property taxes;
3) Low-interest loans and other financing assistance;

Incentivesfor Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377, 463-66 (1996); see also Richard N. Cooper, U.S. Policiesand
Practices on Subsidies in International Trade, in, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES:
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INAN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY 107, 118 (Steven Warnecke ed. 1978); HUFBAUER
& SHELTON-ERB, supra note 6, at 105 (discussing the problem of "abnormal" incentives); JACKSON, supranote
6, at 298-99 (asking what governmental actions should be considered to cause a "distortion").
8. On the benefits of regulatory competition and the existence of different preference sets among different
territorial populations, see Joel Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power, and
Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 413 (1994); Joel Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition,
Externalization,and Jurisdiction, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47, 100-103 (1993); Brander, supra note 2, at 37-38
(discussing the Tiebot model and noting that "efficiency results from individuals revealing, via migration decisions,
their preferences concerning public goods.").
9. On the impact of harmonization on federalism, see Matthew Schaefer, Searchingfor Pareto Gains in
the Relationship Between Free Trade and Federalism"Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
441, 445-47,475-78 (1997).
10. See JAY KAYNE, NATIONAL GOvERNORS' ASSOCIATION, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE:

STATES AND INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES 1, 32 (1992) [hereinafter "NGA"]; see also Summary of Governors/CEOs
Roundtable on Economic Growth and Development Incentives (Jan. 30, 1993) (on file with author).
11. This list is a simplified adaptation of lists provided in Thomas L Brewer & Stephen Young, Investment
Incentives and the InternationalAgenda, INT'L ECON. 175, 181 (1997); Lawrence Kramer et al., Tax Incentives:
To Have orHave Not, 15 J. STATE TAXATION 1, 2-3 (Winter 1997); Lori Hartzheim, State Tax Incentives:Headed
in the Right Direction, 15 J. STATE TAXATION 51, 52-55 (Spring 1997); Jennifer Fahey et al., States Use Several
Methods to Attract and Retain Business, 16 J. STATE TAXATION 45 (Summer 1997); Kimberly Key & James Smith,
Trends in State and Local Economic Development Incentives, 15 J. STATE TAXATION 1, 2-4 (Fall 1996); KAYNE,
supra note 10, at 25.
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4) Infrastructure dedicated to an enterprise; and
5) Preferential government purchasing practices. 2
Many states target incentives at a limited number or even a single large
enterprise. 3 For example, the enormous incentive deals granted by Southern states
to attract foreign automobile manufacturers, such as BMW, Mercedes, and Toyota,
were targeted programs.' 4 However, other investment attraction subsidies are
granted to smaller companies under less targeted programs.
II. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-LEVEL

SUBSIDIES
A.

"Thanks but No Thanks": Differences in the Economics of Subsidies
Between the Internationaland NationalContexts 5
Under standard economic assumptions, state subsidies distort investment and
trade patterns such that, in the absence of a market failure or externalities that the
subsidy attempts to correct, welfare within the nation is reduced as resources are
utilized less efficiently. 6 However, a reduction in national welfare does not
necessarily mean that all states suffer a reduction in welfare. Indeed, we might draw
on international trade economics literature 7 to distinguish between three categories
of states for purposes of analyzing welfare effects: 1) the subsidizing state; 2) states
that are net importers of a product manufactured by a subsidized industry; and 3)
states that are net exporters of a product manufactured by a subsidized industry.
1. The Subsidizing State
A state that subsidizes an industry producing a particular good suffers a welfare
reduction because its subsidization results in the production of goods beyond the
point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs.' Thus, we can imagine why a
state would want to enact a state constitutional provision constraining the state's
capacity to grant subsidies. In observable practice, however, state constitutions have

12. Part of Alabama's incentive package for Mercedes required the state to buy a certain number of
Mercedes automobiles. See Editorial,States Must Know When to Quit in High-Stakes Questfor Industry,OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Sept. 8, 1996, at 14B, available in 1996 WL 6030380.
13. See David Brunori, Principlesof Tax Policy and Targeted Tax Incentives, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1731,
1732 (1997) (noting a 1993 report by the Arizona Department of Revenue that found 25 states enacted tax incentive
legislation for particular companies between 1991 and 1993).
14. See Key & Smith, supra note 11, at 2; Cathy Collins & Sherry Watson, The New War Between the
States: Economic Policy or CorporateWelfare, 15 J. STATE TAXATION 11, 12-14 (Winter 1997).
15. I would like to acknowledge that I have relied heavily on insights gained from a seminar taught jointly
by Professor Alan Deardorff, University of Michigan, and John Jackson, University of Michigan Law School, on
Subsidies in InternationalTrade for this portion of the article. I have adapted the arguments regarding subsidies
in international trade for the context of interstate subsidy wars in the United States. All errors and omissions are
mine.
16. See Alan Deardorff, The Economics of Sabsidies and InternationalTrade (Jan. 12, 1992) (unpublished
paper) (on file with author).
17. See id.; see also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 279-81.
18. Although state investment attraction subsidies are not traditional production subsidies in the form of
a given dollar amount per unit of output, it seems clear they will influence production behavior, particularly if the
continued existence of the subsidy is directly or indirectly linked to the continuation of the productive activity (e.g.
the employment of a certain number of employees).
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not served as a significant limitation on the granting of state subsidies. The reason
for this may have an economic justification.
Indeed, there is at least some doubt whether a subsidizing state has an incentive
to limit its capacity to grant subsidies. This doubt arises because there is an
important caveat to the conclusion that welfare of a subsidizing state is reduced by
granting the subsidy. Welfare may not be reduced if a subsidy is granted to correct
for an externality or market failure. 9 For instance, certain private actors may
provide social benefits from engaging in their activities for which the private market
does not reward them. In other words, marginal social benefits (or costs) may not
be identical to the marginal private benefits (or costs) because the private market
may not value certain benefits (or costs).2' An example might be the subsidization
of dairy farmers in Massachusetts. The existence of dairy farms in Massachusetts,
it might be argued, has a value, namely enhancing the culture, the atmosphere, and
perhaps even tourism of the state, that is not captured by the market. (If you find
such an argument to be strained, similar arguments are in fact made by the European
Community in international trade negotiations regarding its small farmers.)
States generally attempt to justify investment attraction subsidies on the basis of
net tax revenue increases. 2' For example, attracting a large employer to a state
through the granting of a subsidy may be justified because of the public benefits the
enterprise provides to the state. The large enterprise may increase employment that
in turn will increase tax revenues and lower social benefit payments. The attracted
enterprise may also increase state tax revenues through its payment of future
property and income tax payments (even if part of the subsidy is to exempt the
enterprise from some of these taxes) and the tax payments of other companies that
locate or remain in the state as a result of the existence of the attracted enterprise.
In short, the attracted enterprise may provide certain social benefits that are not
accounted for by the market.
2. States That Are Net Importers of a Product Manufactured by an Industry
Subsidized by Another State
A net importing state of a subsidized good may actually have its welfare
increased because the welfare loss to its producers (that lose some sales and profits
as a result of the subsidized import) is overshadowed by the welfare gain to its
consumers (that pay lower prices for the subsidized good). Hence, one might argue
by analogizing to international trade economic theory that the net importing state
should send a "thank-you note" to a subsidizing state.' However, "thank you" notes

19. See Caroline Pestieau, Revising the GATTApproach to Subsidies: A Canadian View, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL PoLIcms: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY 91,98 (Steven

Wanecke ed. 1978); Harald B. Malmgren, Negotiations of Rules on Subsidies in a World of Economic
Interventionism, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIEs: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AN OPEN
WORLD ECONOMY 210,217 (Steven Wamecke ed. 1978); Stephen Cohen et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN

TRADE POLICY 66-67 (1996); Deardorff, supra note 16.
20. See Pestieau, supra note 19, at 98; Deardorff, supranote 16.
21. See James Rogers, The Futility of State Tax Competition 3-4 (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
22. Paul Krugman was the first to make this "thank you" note argument in international trade economics
literature. See Deardorff, supranote 16; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 281.
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are not observed in practice. Rather, one observes states engaging in subsidy wars
to attract investment.
Why do states not send "thank you" notes? There may be several reasons. First,
it may be difficult to achieve the income redistribution that would be necessary to
make all those in the importing state better off (i.e. achieve a Pareto improvement
by requiring consumers to compensate the domestic producers) because highly
visible instruments of income distribution are often politically difficult to enact.2 3
Second, if the subsidization is predatory (i.e. seeking to drive out competition), then
the welfare gains will be short lived.24 Lastly, if the subsidy actually prevented
business capital and employees from moving to its state, then the state will lose tax
revenue and other benefits associated with the investment. Capital and labor are
more mobile nationally than internationally and thus the "thank you" note argument
of international trade economists is less likely to apply in the interstate context.
3. States That Are Net Exporters of a Product Manufactured by an Industry
Subsidized by Another State
A net exporting state will not send a "thank you" note to a subsidizing state
because it will suffer a welfare loss (because the producer welfare loss in such
states will exceed the welfare gains to consumers).' States that are net exporters of
the product may also hesitate to send a "thank you" note for one of the additional
reasons identified above with respect to net importing states. A net exporting state
may also lose tax revenue and other benefits associated with an investment if the
subsidy prevents a business from locating in its state.
B.

Competing Versions of State Subsidy Wars
There exist two competing versions of the effectiveness of state investment
attraction subsidies on the locational decisions of businesses:
Version #1: Subsidies Are an Effective Tool for Attracting Investment
States are engaged in subsidy wars because subsidies are an effective tool for
attracting investment. A state can actually change the investment location decision
of a business by offering that business a subsidy. Subsidies can overcome locational
advantages of another state such as a more educated work force or closeness to a
larger consumer base. A state aggressively utilizing subsidies can create jobs, cure
economic difficulties, or enhance economic growth, and thus increase net tax
revenues at a much quicker pace than through longer-term policies such as
increasing state education levels.
Version #2: Subsidies Are an Ineffective Tool for Attracting Investment
Subsidies are an ineffective tool for attracting investment. Businesses make
location decisions based on the general business climate of a state and other natural
advantages of locating within the state. The differences in subsidies granted by
states are not large enough to overcome other locational advantages (hereinafter

23. See Deardorff, supra note 16.
24. See HUFBAUER & SHELTON-ERB, supra note 6, at 5; Deardorff, supra note 16.
25. See Deardorff,supra note 16.
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"version #2A"). Alternatively, competing subsidies may entirely cancel one another
out, leading business to locate in the state which they would have chosen in the
absence of the subsidy competition (hereinafter "version #2B"). As a result,
investment attraction subsidies are in essence unnecessary "give-aways."
If version #1 is correct, there is a risk that efficient allocation of resources may
be distorted and national welfare may be reduced. This risk is present because states
may offer subsidies without properly identifying and measuring externalities.
Indeed, how likely is this to be the case? Should state government officials be
trusted to properly identify externalities and measure the marginal social benefits
captured by an investment attraction subsidy? Public choice theory suggests that
politicians may grant subsidies to well-organized, rent-seeking, special interests in
order to advance their political standing with groups likely to contribute to reelection campaigns.2" On a more general level, attracting major employees may give
the politician more favorable press attention in the short-term than longer term
projects by which a state could attract investment such as increasing state education
levels. Governors, as well as other state politicians, often face pressure to be seen
as "doing something," particularly in hard economic times. 7 Political
considerations aside, states often will have difficulties accurately measuring
benefits of attracted enterprises and operate with less than perfect information.2 8
Version #2 paints an even darker picture. Under this version subsidies are
wasteful transfers regardless of whether states are properly measuring externalities.
If differences in competing subsidies are never large enough to influence locational
choice as alleged by version #2A, then the state chosen by the enterprise would be
chosen without granting the subsidy. The same conclusion applies with greater
force if version #2B is correct in its allegation that subsidies entirely cancel one
another out.
Empirical data and surveys of business executives indicate that version #2 is
closer to reality than version #1, although there is some indication that subsidies
may act as a "tie-breaker" if all other factors are equal.29 It is not necessary,
however, to choose between these two versions to conclude that state subsidy wars
should be curbed. The subsidy wars reduce state revenue collections and the
provision of public goods that would occur if states limited bidding wars. This is
true even if version #1 is true and states are properly measuring externalities. State
subsidy wars result in a transfer of a large amount of the positive externalities or
extra social benefits to the attracted enterprise. Indeed, "game theory" analysis
suggests that states will increase their bids until the net tax revenue effect is zero.30

26. On public choice theory, see Alan Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases, 16 INT'L REV. L &ECON. 5, 18-21 (1996).
27. See KAYNE, supra note 10, at vii.
28. See, e.g., Malmgren, supra nota 19, at 218 (noting the difficulty of measuring benefits over a time
horizon).
29. For a review of economic studies and surveys in this area, see Robert Lynch, The Effectiveness of State
and Local Tax Cuts and Incentives: A Review of the Literature, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 949 (1996) (summarizing
the major findings of hundreds of studies); Key & Smith, supra note 11, at 5-8; Kramer et al., supra note 11, at
4-7; Hartzheim, supra note 11, at 56-57.
30. See Brander, supranote 2, at 50-51; Rogers, supra note 21, at 5.; Jeffrey Atik, Investment Contests and
Subsidy Limitationsin the EC, 32 VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 837, 856 (1992).
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Yet, states persist in these investment attraction subsidy wars because they find
themselves confronted with a prisoner's dilemma-type situation.
C.

States (and Their Officials) in a Prisoner'sDilemma-Type Situation
The prisoner's dilemma is typically described as follows:
Two prisoners are separately interrogated by the authorities, who attempt to
extract confessions from each implicating the other. If both are silent, each will
go free. If both confess, each will get a moderate sentence. If one confesses and
the other does not, the former will get a light sentence and the latter a heavy
sentence. Accordingly, both prisoners would be best off if each remains silent,
but each fears the other will confess. To avoid the danger of the heavy sentence
that would follow from the other's confession, each confesses and incurs a
moderate sentence. The prisoners are unable to reach their preferred outcome
(total silence) because they are unable to communicate and reach a binding
agreement. 3'

How does the prisoner's dilemma apply to the situation of state subsidy wars?
Each state would be better off not offering investment attraction subsidies (i.e.
"remaining silent") with one small qualification. The small qualification is added
because ideally, in a situation in which two states are bidding against one another,
the state with the greater externalities should be allowed to be the sole bidder and
then only to the extent of the externality difference.3 2 However, since externalities
may be difficult to measure and in many cases there may not be significant
differences between states in terms of externalities associated with an attracted
enterprise, this qualification is not so large.
A state that idly sits by while other states offer investment attraction subsidies
will have a heavy sentence placed upon it as mobile capital and tax revenues
accompanying the capital flow to those other states. Individual politicians and state
judges, many of whom face retention elections, find themselves in an individual
prisoner's dilemma. If they remain silent by refusing to offer or uphold incentive
packages, they will be perceived of as "do nothing" politicians or "obstructionist"
judges by citizens of their state that witness other states utilizing incentive
packages.
Thus, each state chooses to participate in the investment attraction subsidy
competitions (i.e. confess). As a result, each state incurs a sentence in the form of

31. See Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentalRegulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE LJ.
2039, 2058 n.84 (1993). For a similar description, see Brander, supra note 2, at 41-42.
32. See Atik, supra note 30, at 867-868. Note that Atik's analysis is refined even further, for it accounts
for pre-subsidy locational advantages from the point of view of the business being sought. I ignore this element
because it is hard for me to believe that states will be able to force businesses to reveal this information. Further,
in the absence of the cooperation of the business, it would be difficult for a state to assess this information (at least
without significant costs). My somewhat simplified rule leads to the same result in nearly all instances, particularly
if one assumes that a less attractive location will have higher externalities or marginal social benefits resulting from
the attraction of the business. The only instance in which a different result will occur under the two rules is if the
more attractive location also derives greater social benefits from the attracted enterprise. Under my rule, the more
attractive location may grant a small subsidy (equal to the difference in externalities between the two competing
jurisdictions) that will be wasteful in the sense the business would choose to locate in the state even without the
subsidy.
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reduced ability to provide public goods or a higher tax burden on the general public.
Even if the subsidy leads to a "net" increase in tax revenue, the net increase in
revenues are not as substantial as they would have been had states communicated
externality information and enforced an agreement that only the state with the
largest externality could bid and then only to the extent of the externality difference.33
In a worst case scenario, improper measurement of externalities or an "arms race"
mentality in the bidding war may lead to a net tax revenue loss for the "winning"
state.
I.POSSIBLE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON INVESTMENT
ATTRACTION SUBSIDIES: STATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS IN THE
PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Many state constitutions contain provisions that appear on their face to act as
potential limits on states granting investment attraction subsidies, particularly those
subsidies targeted at a limited class of recipients. For instance, many state
constitutions prohibit the state from granting aid to, making donations to, extending
the credit of the state to, or assuming the debts of, private corporations and
individuals.' While many of these same constitutions contain explicit textual
exceptions to these prohibitions for a narrow set of circumstances such as "cases of
public calamity,"3 the development of energy resources, or "time of war, 37 these
exceptions do not apply in the context of most investment attraction subsidy wars.
These state constitutional prohibitions were adopted, at least in part, to ensure an
equality of treatment among all private actors operating within the state and avoid
the potential for corruption and influence peddling." Some states adopting
constitutional bans on aid to private corporations were overwhelmed with
legislation helping a select number and type of private actors, particularly the
railroads.39 Such legislation was passed because attracting a railroad line was
thought to be critical for economic development since the existence of the railroad
would attract other economic enterprises. This is similar to the rationale behind
granting subsidies to large companies for investment attraction purposes today.
These large employers will have a multiplier effect on the rest of the economy.

33. See Ljubomir Nacev & Kim Kelley, State Tax Literature Review, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 1603 (1996)
(citing Mark A. Jenn & Farrokh Nourzad, Determinants of Economic Development Incentives Offered By States:
A Test of the Arms Race Hypothesis, 26 REv. OF REGIONAL STUD. 1 (1996), and concluding that the results strongly
support the hypothesis).
34. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. XVL § 6; IOWA CONST. art. VIL § 1; N.M. CONST.
art. IX, § 14; OR. CONST. art. XI, § 8; PA. CONST. art. VIi, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. RI, § 51.
35. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 51.
36. See COLO.CONST. art. XL § 7.
37.

IOWA CONST. art. VIL § 1.

38. See Dale Rubin, Public Purpose in the Northwest: A Sinkhole of Judicial Interpretation-The Case
for Alternatives in the Delivery of Public Services and the Granting of Subsidies, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 417, 420
(1996).
39. See, e.g., Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 331 A.2d 198 (Penn. 1975) (upholding
the Nursing Home Loan Agency Law as constitutional); Jay A. Reich, Lending of Credit Reinterpreted: New
Opportunities for Public and Private Sector Cooperation, 19 GONZ. L REV. 639, 641-42 (1983-84) (noting that
by 1900 most state constitutions contained some form of limitation on aid to railroads).
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However, the constitutional prohibitions were passed because it was believed that
railroad corporations gained favored status through heavy-handed tactics. 4°
Other constitutional provisions arguably limiting a state's ability to offer
investment attraction incentives, particularly those targeted at a limited class of
recipients, include prohibitions on special legislation, 4' requirements of uniform
taxation, 42 requirements that state appropriations be for a public purpose,4 3 and state
equal protection clauses. 44 However, state constitutional provisions have been
interpreted by state courts in a manner that allows subsidies targeted towards a
particular large enterprise.45 These court opinions often evince an awareness of and
concern over the prisoner's dilemma and the heavy penalty that will be placed on
a state unilaterally disarming (and possibly the judges responsible for the unilateral
disarmament).
A.

Colorado:Attracting UnitedAirlines Constitutional?
In 1991, Colorado Governor Roy Romer asked the Colorado Supreme Court to
rule on the facial constitutionality of using the Colorado Business Incentive Fund
(CBIF) to fund "intergovernmental agreements" with local governments for the
purposes of providing incentives for entities to establish new business facilities in
the state employing a substantial number of new employees.' The funds in the
CBIF are subject to annual appropriation by the Colorado General Assembly. Under
the proposed program, the state was to consider a number of factors, including
financial incentives provided by the local jurisdiction to the private entity, the
number of new jobs at the facility, the extent of employment of Colorado residents,
and the extent to which the new business facility intended to contract with Colorado
residents and companies for goods and services at the new facility, before entering
into an intergovernmental agreement.47 In essence, the program would allow the
state to use the CBIF to help local governments in their efforts to attract private
enterprises to locate within the state.
Under the legislation, intergovernmental agreements could not be entered into
unless there was an agreement between the local government and the business entity
that contained the following provisions and obligations: 1) that the entity will
operate the facility for 30 years and will provide 3,000 employees with an average
annual salary of $45,000; 2) that the entity will establish an ancillary facility to be

40. See Reich, supra note 39, at 642-43; Rubin, supranote 38, at 420.
41.

See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25; NEB. CONST. art

I, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; S.D. CONST.

art. 1a § 23.
42. See JEROME HEUERSITIN, STATE TAXATION, 29-40 (1983) (noting nearly all state constitutions contain
provisions requiring taxes to be uniform or equal or both); see, e.g., NEs. CONST. art. Vm, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
XI, § 2.
43. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. V § 2, cl. I.

44. See HEUERSTEIN, supra note 42, at 41-42 (noting that most state constitutions have a counterpart to
the federal equal protection clause).
45. See infra notes 47-107 and accompanying text; see also John Hayes & Paul Godec, Tax Innovations:
Enhanced Sales Tax Incentive Programs, 22 URB. LAW. 143 (1990) (discussing and dismissing potential state

constitutional limits on using sales taxes for tax increment financing).
46. See In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875
(Colo. 1991).
47. See id. at 879.
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established by the tenth year that will employ at least 2,000 additional persons; and
3) that certain sanctions and remedies are available if the entity fails to meet the
commitments entered into under the agreement." Total incentives provided to the
entity could not exceed $115 million. Additionally, money from the aviation fund
(consisting of certain revenues from state taxes on aviation fuel), that would
ordinarily go to the governmental entity operating the airport from which the taxes
are derived, would be transferred to the CBIF if the governmental entity entered into
an intergovernmental agreement. 49 The apparent oddity of these provisions,
particularly the last one relating to the aviation fund, is explained when one realizes
that the entire program was established for the purposes of luring United Airlines
to build a new facility in Denver. Indeed, Governor Romer called an extraordinary
session of the legislature to consider the legislation, stating that the United Airlines
"deal" was a unique opportunity for the state because of the number of new job
opportunities in the United Airlines proposal to build the maintenance facility in
Denver. 50
Colorado's constitution article XI section 2 prohibits the state as well as counties
and cities from making "any donation or grant to, or in aid of, . . . any
corporation., 5 Article V section 34 prohibits any appropriation "made for
charitable, industrial educational or benevolent purposes to any person, corporation
or community not under the absolute control of the state." The majority in In re
Interrogatoryacknowledged that these prohibitions were strictly enforced early in
Colorado's jurisprudential history.52 Indeed, early Colorado cases held that if the
existence of a "public benefit" exempted a transaction from these constitutional53
prohibitions, then these prohibitions would be "utterly nugatory and valueless.,
Nonetheless, the majority in In re Interrogatory noted that a public purpose
exception to the prohibitions contained in article XI section 2 and article V section
34 had developed in later cases.54 However, to fall within the public purpose
exception the legislation is required to evince a "discrete and particularized" public
purpose which "preponderates over any individual interests incidentally served by
the statutory program., 55 The majority identified two "discrete and particularized"
public purposes. The first was the development of new businesses undertaking a
long-term expansion of state employment, and the second was the provision of
direct and indirect benefits to the state aviation system.56
Justice Kirshbaum, concurring in part and dissenting in part, felt that the general
power of the general assembly to legislate in the public interest was limited by
special constitutional provisions like article V section 34. Therefore, the
development of a broad public purposes exception to that constitutional provision

48. See id.
49. See id. at 879-80.
50. See id. at 881 (citing the Governor's Proclamation for the First Extraordinary Session of the 58th
General Assembly).
51.

COLO.CONST., art. XL § 2.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d at 882 (citing Colorado Cent. R.R. v. Lea, 5 Colo. 192 (1879)).
Id.
See id. at 882-83 (citing McNichols v. City of Denver, 280 P.2d 1096 (Colo. 1995)).
Id. at 884.
See id.
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was illogical. He noted that appropriations to destitute farmers (through county
commissioners) after a drought-induced crop failure had been previously struck
down and that the public purpose exception was only launched by a "bare majority"
of the court in a case upholding appropriations for payments to two retired supreme
court justices.57 Justice Kirshbaum believed that, although appropriations were
directed into the CBIF, the fund was a mere conduit through which appropriations
would flow to private corporations (in this instance, United Airlines). 8
Justice Kirshbaum also maintained that the public purpose exception carved out
in previous court cases did not allow legislation to avoid the prohibition contained
in article V section 34 on the basis of a broad public purpose, such as job creation
at issue in the United Airlines legislation. Justice Kirshbaum distinguished other
cases that relied on the public purpose exception, including those upholding
appropriations to housing programs for low-income persons and student incentives,
because the programs at issue truly were for a "discrete and particularized" public
purpose.59 The distinction he attempted was obviously fraught with difficulties.
However, the thrust of his argument was supported by another dissenter who
for
claimed that "the well-intentioned motive of lawmakers...is not a surrogate
6
objective constitutional norms applicable to legislative enactments."
The majority in In re Interrogatoryalso dismissed claims that the legislation
violated article V section 25 that prevents special laws granting a corporation "any
special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise.... '' 6 ' The majority
acknowledged that the program was developed for United Airlines but asserted that
the relevant question was whether the legislation created true classes and whether
6
these classes were reasonable and rationally related to legitimate public purposes. "
The majority conceded that the class created could not be de facto limited to a
single corporation.63 Although the class of companies eligible to benefit from the
proposed legislation was small, the majority noted that the legislation established
no time limit such that other corporations might meet the requirements in the
future. 64
Moreover, in the majority's view the distinctions relating to the class established
were reasonable. The state could rationally conclude that the economic advantages
of larger corporations would outweigh the expense of the incentives granted
whereas the advantages created by smaller corporations might not outweigh the
since
expenses involved.65 Additionally, the use of the aviation fund was reasonable
66
the constitution mandates that such taxes be used for aviation purposes.
Dissenting Justices Quinn and Rovira found that the legislation was special
legislation designed to benefit United Airlines. The purpose of article V section 25

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 894.
See id. at 890.
See id. at 895-96.
Id. at 896 (Quinn J., dissenting).
Id. at 885.
See id.
See id. at 887.
See id.
See id. at 888.
See id.
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was to prevent "legislative enactments that either benefit[ted] or disadvantage[d]
a particular person, entity or artificially created group."'67 These justices believed
that the determination of a legislative enactment as a special law could be revealed
by its legislative purpose as evinced by official remarks on the legislation.68 They
noted that the economic incentives were uniquely tailored by the Governor to obtain
a commitment from United Airlines to build and operate a maintenance facility in
Denver.69 Moreover, the Governor told the legislature that United Airlines had
many options and would play a "tough hand."70 While United Airlines cannot be
blamed for protecting their shareholders' interests by playing a "tough hand," the
types of state constitutional prohibitions at issue were enacted in many states in
response to the "tough hand" played by large corporations in the past, particularly
railroads.
B.

Kentucky: Attracting Toyota Constitutional?
The Kentucky Supreme Court has also reviewed economic development
legislation passed to attract a single large enterprise. In 1986, the State of Kentucky
assembled a package of economic incentives to lure Toyota Motor Corporation to
establish a plant in Scott County. The majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court
upheld the package of incentives as constitutional, stating that its role was not to act
as superlegislature. 7'
Under the economic development legislation,72 Kentucky pledged to acquire a
1600 acre project site in Scott County for Toyota and then develop the site for $35
million. Revenue bonds issued by the State Property and Buildings Commission
were used to finance the development. The funds needed to pay debt service on the
bonds came from appropriations from the general funds of the state on a biennial
basis as an expense item of the Commerce Cabinet (a state agency). Under the terms
of the act, property was conveyed to the applicable industrial entity (in this case
Toyota) at the time the revenue bonds were issued if the commission made a written
determination that the "incremental taxes" to be derived as a result of the
development are reasonably expected to be at least equal to the principal amount of
the revenue bonds. "Incremental taxes" were statutorily defined as those taxes
which would never have existed but for the inducement of the facility to locate in
Kentucky. In the case of Toyota, the state expected to increase income tax
collections by $75 million and expected substantial increases in corporate taxes as
well. Furthermore, the increased value of the real estate of the Toyota site would
allow additional property taxes to be collected. Under the legislation, if the
industrial entity conveyed the property before incremental taxes repaid the
principal, the remaining difference would be due.
As in the Colorado case, the targeted incentive package implicated numerous
provisions of the state constitution. Section 177 of the Kentucky Constitution states

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 897 (citing Denver v. Bach, 58 P. 1089, 1090 (1899)).
See id. at 898.
See id.
See id. at 899.
See Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987).
The description that follows is derived from the case itself. See id. at 798.

Spnng 1998]

STATE SUBSIDY WARS

that the "credit of the Commonwealth shall not be given, pledged or loaned to any
individual company or corporation, nor shall the Commonwealth make a donation
to any company or corporation."" a The majority found that the legislation did not
violate this provision because a public purpose exception was available and the
relief of unemployment is a public purpose that would justify the outlay of funds. 4
Dissenting Justice Liebson argued that as a matter of logic the state had either
extended credit to Toyota or made a donation to Toyota in violation of Section 177.
If there was no donation because incremental taxes would pay for project in the
long run, then the state had lent money to Toyota in the meantime." Moreover,
dissenting Justice Stephenson dismissed as disingenuous arguments that no credit
was lent because nothing secured the bonds other than a promise, that did not
constitute a legal obligation, by the state to provide debt service in future biennial
appropriations. In practical terms, if the state did not provide for debt service on the
bonds it would destroy its credit rating.76 The dissenting justices also argued that to
claim there was no donation because of incremental taxes would give Toyota double
credit for the tax payments. 7 The dissenting justices believed that all taxpayers
have an equal right to receive government services for their taxes. However,
Toyota's corporate taxes and property taxes are used to pay for the project site
instead of governmental services.7" Moreover, Toyota is given credit for the
increase in income taxes collected by the state from the individuals that Toyota
hires.79 Therefore, the dissent found that Toyota is not paying its pro rata share of
police protection and other governmental benefits.
Lastly, some of the dissenting justices disagreed with the creation of a "public
purpose" exception. Justice Stephenson argued that majority had in essence
amended Section 177 by adding at the end of that provision "except for a valid
public purpose."' Justice Liebson accused the majority of succumbing "to powerful
non judicial arguments advanced to uphold this legislation in the face of the
constitutional challenge."" One such argument is that "the benefits to our state to
be derived from economic job development and job opportunities [created by the
Toyota projects] are so great that the constitution must be judicially amended to
accommodate the financing arrangements." 2 In essence, the dissent was troubled
with the fact that the arrangements directly benefitted private actors and incidentally
benefitted the public, rather than visa versa.
Sections 49 and 50 of the Kentucky Constitution that "strictly limit the power of
the legislature to financially obligate future legislatures without the permission of
the people by means of a direct vote" were also implicated. 3 According to the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 799.
See id. at 799-800.
See id. at811.
dissenting).
See id. at 817; see also id. at 819 (Vance, J.,
See id. at 812, 817-18.
See, e.g., id. at 817.
See id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 802.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Kentucky Constitution, when the state incurs debt through the issuance of general
obligation bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the state, the people must
approve the issuance of the bonds. 4 However, prior to the legislation involved in
the Toyota case, the state also incurred debt by issuing revenue bonds.8" These
revenue bonds are not backed by the credit of the state but rather by the revenues
of the project being financed and thus do not mandate approval by the people of the
state through a direct vote.86 Previously, revenue bonds financed state owned and
state operated projects that carried out functions performed by the state.87 The
security for payment of the bonds had taken the form of rentals in most cases (the
building being leased to an operating governmental agency). The rental payments
were based on two-year serial leases so as to not run afoul of Sections 49 and 508
Since government agencies used the projects to carry out their operations, the
biennial appropriation of tax money from the state treasury to an operating
department of state government could qualify as rent to cover the current operating
expenses of government. The majority found that the Toyota legislation did not
violate Sections 49 and 50 of the constitution since the bonds at issue could be
considered revenue bonds. The majority claimed that the mere fact that incremental
taxes was innovative did not foreclose a conclusion that the requirements of revenue
bonds were met. 9 Indeed, the majority found that the incremental taxes could be
considered rent as the legislation proposed.'
Dissenting Justice Liebson strongly disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the incremental tax financing device met the criteria of the revenue bond concept.
Under previous revenue bonds, a state authority (e.g. the Turnpike Authority) had
possession of the financed project and therefore could charge rent to a state agency
(e.g. the Commerce Cabinet) that used the project for operations. 91 In contrast,
under the incremental tax device, the commerce cabinet would pay rent to pay off
the project but it would neither occupy or utilize the site in any meaningful sense
directly connected with the carrying on of the activities of the department. 92 Justice
Liebson concluded in the context of the legislation that
[n]ever before has the revenue bond concept been called upon to cover a project
which cannot be described as owned by or in possession of the public agency
issuing the bonds until the bonds are paid, and never before has the revenue
bond concept been applied where the project did not provide an ongoing service
of the kind usually provided by an agency of government.93
In short, the Commerce Cabinet would pay the rent to provide the debt service on
the bonds (as the legislature approves appropriations that will technically be coming

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 802-03
See id. at 803-04.
See id. at 804.
See id. at 808.
See id. at 809.
Id.
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from the incremental taxes) despite the fact it has no further connection to the
project once it is approved (for Toyota operates the project). Justice Vance added
that because the program de facto obligated the state to appropriate funds every
biennium to pay off the bonds (since to do otherwise the state would destroy its
credit rating) the revenue of the commonwealth had been obligated beyond the
biennium of the current General Assembly violating sections 49 and 50 of the
constitution.9 4
Finally, the majority also held that the legislation was consistent with section 59
of the constitution which prohibits special legislation. The intent of the prohibition
on special legislation is to prevent favoritism and discrimination in order to ensure
equality before -the law.95 The court held that the legislation was not directed
specifically at Toyota, although the majority at least acknowledged that the Toyota
96
project ignited the interest in the particular method of financing. The court
observed that the language of the legislation is general and available for use in
connection with other valid industrial projects. 97 Dissenting Justice Vance
concluded that the financing mechanism was special legislation in violation of
section 59. The legislative criteria for approval of projects was so vague that the
benefits of this type of funding mechanism could be bestowed at the will of the state
government.98
The Influence of the Prisoner'sDilemma on State Constitutional
Interpretation
The opinions written by the Colorado and Kentucky state supreme courts display
a significant tension between those justices believing that a constitution must adapt
and change to today's society and those justices believing that it is for the people,
and not judges, to amend the constitution if the times so demand. In both cases,
divided state supreme courts ultimately sided with state programs designed to attract
businesses. These state courts succumbed to, or at least acknowledged, the
economic and political realities leading to the creation of these programs. Indeed,
in its final paragraph before pronouncing its holding, the Kentucky Supreme Court
noted the severe unemployment facing the State of Kentucky in relationship to the
rest of the country. 99 Earlier in its opinion, the court noted the number of jobs that
the Toyota plant would create. While these considerations can be explained in a
legal context because the court had to determine whether the financing mechanism
achieved a public purpose, they also can be seen as a recognition of the economic
and political realities facing the state. Indeed, the court implicitly acknowledged the
prisoner's dilemma facing the state by noting that several states had fiercely
competed with Kentucky for the Toyota plant."00 The court's attention to the fierce
C.

94. See id. at 819-20.
95. See id. at 804.
96. See id. at 804-05.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 821-22.
99. See id. at 805 (noting that at the time the program was put together the national unemployment rate was
6.8% while the state unemployment rate was more than 10%).
100. See id. at 798.
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competition over the plant was not necessary in order to find a public purpose. The
Colorado Supreme Court also implicitly acknowledged the similar bidding war for
United Airlines.
Any remaining doubts that the prisoner's dilemma increasingly influences state
constitutional interpretation was removed in a recent North Carolina Supreme Court
opinion that explicitly recognized the prisoner's dilemma confronting its state. In
August 1995 an individual North Carolina tax payer was victorious at the trial court
level in a state constitutional challenge to investment attraction subsidies offered
by the City of Winston-Salem. I0 l The decision sent shock waves through the
economic development community and was quickly appealed to the state supreme
court.' ° 2 At issue was a state constitutional provision requiring that tax money be
spent for "public purposes only."'0 3 The plaintiff taxpayer relied on a 1968 state
supreme court opinion that struck down state efforts to compete for investment by
establishing an authority to "acquire sites and to construct and equip facilities for
private industry" through industrial revenue bond financing." The 1968 Mitchell
opinion found that use of funds in this manner was "not for a public purpose."'0 5
The 1968 Mitchell opinion explicitly observed that North Carolina sought to
establish such an authority to "compete for industry with neighboring states" that
use similar subsidies."° Nevertheless, the 1968 North Carolina Supreme Court
struck down the statute noting that the General Assembly considered the act "bad
public policy.""' 7 Twenty-eight years later the North Carolina Supreme Court was
more sympathetic to the prisoner's dilemma confronting the state in competing for
investment, in part due to constitutional amendments enacted subsequent to the
1968 case. In 1973, the North Carolina constitution was amended to allow counties
to create authorities to issue revenue bonds for industrial and pollution control
facilities and to allow appropriations directly to private parties for "public
purposes."' ' Thus, the court still was required to find a public purpose for direct
subsidies. The court recognized that its 1968 opinion defined "public purpose."
However, the court found that "the passage of time and accompanying societal
changes" suggested a different answer as to whether investment incentives serve a
public purpose."°9 The prisoner's dilemma influenced the court's holding that
investment incentives, such as paying for job training and facilities upgrades for
business enterprises, served a public purpose. The court stated:
In the economic climate thus depicted, the pressure to induce responsible
corporate citizens to relocate to or expand in North Carolina is not internal only,
but results from the actions of other states as well. To date, courts in forty-six
states have upheld the constitutionality of governmental expenditures and

101. See Ken Gepfert & Kevin Salwen, Incentive Defeat in North CarolinaMay Be FirstSalvo in Wider
Battle, WAIL ST. J., August 16, 1995, at S1.
102. See id.
103. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2, cl. 1.
104. Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745, 761 (N.C. 1968).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 751.
107. Id.
108. N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(7); see Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 623 (N.C. 1996).
109. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 623.
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related assistance for economic development incentives.... [B]y virtue of the
trial court's ruling, North Carolina currently stands alone in holding [investment
incentives illegal]. Considered in this light, it would be unrealistic to assume
that the State will not suffer economically in the future if incentive programs
.. are discontinued .... "All men know that in our efforts to attract new
industry we are competing with inducements to industry offered through
legislative enactments in other jurisdictions as stated in the legislative findings
and purposes of [the] challenged [North Carolina] [aict." 0
The majority was criticized by the dissenting justice for employing a "philosophy
and application are subject to the whims of
that constitutional interpretation
'everybody's doing it. '"". Yet, state judges should not receive too much blame for
the current subsidy war. Even if state judges interpreted state constitutional
provisions to restrict state subsidies, the prisoner's dilemma would likely persist as
a result of constitutional amendment. As noted above in the context of North
Carolina, state constitutions have previously been amended in response to judicial
determinations striking down state incentive programs or simply to clarify that
states can engage in such activities."2 Amending a state constitution is much easier
than amending the federal constitution. Thus, one must look beyond state
constitutions for the solution to the prisoner's dilemma.
IV. POTENTIAL EXISTING NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Agreement Between the States
A prisoner's dilemma involves the inability to communicate and an inability to
enforce any agreement between the prisoners to maintain their silence. States, of
course, may communicate with one another with respect to bids offered for
investment attraction purposes. States could remove themselves from the prisoner's
dilemma causing bidding wars by entering into an agreement to share information
and to limit bidding based on an assessment of the externality differences. In
practice, states have, at least in certain instances, refused to share information on
bids believing that such information will lessen their ability to attract an enterprise
by giving other states a better ability to improve on their own offers. In the absence
of communication, the states must rely on information given by the attracted
business. The attracted business will have an incentive to inflate the amount of a
competing state's bid.
On occassion, however, states have made some attempts to maintain informal
agreements with respect to investment attraction subsidies on both a regional and
national basis. The agreements are not interstate compacts contemplated in the
A.

110. Id. at 626 (quoting Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fn. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745,764 (N.C. 1968)
(Parker, C.J., dissenting)).
111. Id. at 634 (Orr, J., dissenting).
112. See., e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 52-a (adopted November 3, 1987) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of this constitution," the state can create programs and make loans or grants "for the public
purposes of development and diversification of the economy of the state [and] the elimination of unemployment
or underemployment in the state.").
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Constitution that require congressional approval." 3 Rather, the agreements have
been non-binding and unenforceable. As such they have been ineffective in solving
the prisoner's dilemma.
In the late 1980's, certain Midwestern state governors sought to call a "truce" to
the investment attraction subsidy wars." 4 In 1991, New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut entered into a non-binding agreement to avoid offering incentives to
businesses to relocate from one state in the agreement to another." ' However, these
informal regional agreements were honored in the breach and rapidly
disintegrated." 6 More recently, Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois led an effort within
the National Governors' Association (NGA) to educate governors on the harm of
bidding wars and to enact a code of conduct on subsidy practices. In response to this
effort the NGA passed a resolution in 1993 attempting to limit state investment
attraction subsidies, particularly to individual enterprises.'' The resolution
recognizes that competition for investment among states will involve subsidies but
that it "should not be characterized by how much direct assistance a state can
provide to individual companies.""' It also requests states to adhere to certain
criteria when providing subsidies, including that public subsidies "should benefit
and be available to all businesses.""' 9 However, this "general availability" criteria
is qualified, for the policy states that public subsidies should be in the form of
infrastructure and workforce investments but that such investments "may be tied to
the location or expansion of an individual company."' 2 ° The policy subsequently
scales back this exception somewhat, by adding that "the improvements in the
workforce and community should not be wholly dependent on the fortune of one
business and should be viewed as assets for other businesses that locate in the
community. ' The NGA resolution also encouraged governors to communicate
regarding their respective subsidy packages in a bidding war, stating that
"[g]overnors should have the right to verify the accuracy of... information"
provided by businesses on other states' incentive packages."n While the policy may
have led to some increase in communication between states, the policy was never
2
legally enforceable and has, in any event, expired.1 1
A legally enforceable interstate compact binding on all fifty states almost
certainly will never be negotiated. At least a few governors expressed concerns with
the limited proposal to develop a non-binding code and many more might have
objected to an effort to create a binding agreement. The concern that some
governors might have with a binding agreement is that it will not provide for
113. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 10, cl. 3.
114. See Jennifer L Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on Development
Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAw. 427, 446 (1995).
115. See Collins & Watson, supra note 14, at 18.
116. See id.; Gilbert, supra note 114, at 446.
117. See National Governor's Association, Policy Resolution EDC-3, Economic Growth and Development
Incentives (adopted August 1993).
118. Id. § 3.2.2.
119. Id. § 3.2.3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id The policy expired August 1995.

Spring 1998]

STATE SUBSIDY WARS

sufficient guarantees against cheating without involving the federal government.
Governors are probably loath to ask for federal intervention in the subsidies area
unless it would be accompanied by reduced federal intervention in other areas. To
the extent an interstate agreement only covers certain states, the agreement will be
insufficient to eliminate the prisoner's dilemma.
B.

Dormant Commerce Clause Constraints
The U.S. Constitution grants the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce to Congress. 4 However, at least since the middle of the 19th century,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause not only as enabling the
federal government to regulate but also as disabling the states from discriminating
against or unreasonably burdening interstate and foreign commerce even when
Congress has not acted." The so-called dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states
from enacting tariffs against out-of-state products or otherwise enacting
protectionist regulations or taxes. 26 Thus, the U.S. Constitution prohibits at least
one means by which states might compete for investment. If protectionist trade
barriers between the states were enacted, there would be incentives to invest in each
state in order to produce products locally and avoid the trade barriers. However,
beyond simply prohibiting border trade barriers and protectionist product standards
and taxes, does the U.S. Constitution place further limits on state competition for
investment?
State investment attraction subsidies have rarely been challenged under the
dormant Commerce Clause for two primary reasons. First, the likelihood of success
of such a challenge is uncertain with respect to tax incentives and nearly nonexistent with respect to non-tax subsidies. 27 Second, the typical class of plaintiffs
under the dormant Commerce Clause, namely large interstate businesses, have little
or no incentive to challenge such subsidies since they are the primary beneficiaries' and it is unlikely that states will become plaintiffs in such cases.
1. Likelihood of Successful Challenge
a. Non-Tax Incentives
The U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated a market participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause. 29 As a result of the exception, dormant Commerce
Clause constraints do not apply when the state acts as a participant in the market

124. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
125. Dormant aspects of the Commerce Clause have been recognized by the Supreme Court since Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 8.4 (4th ed. 1991).
126. See generally, Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L REV. 1091, 1125 (1986).
127. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
128. See Enrich, supra note 7, at 408-13.
129. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-11 (1983); Reeves
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-40 (1979); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806-10 (1976); see
generally Dan Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L REV. 395 (1989).
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(i.e. a buyer or seller of goods), rather than as a regulator or tax authority. Direct
payment subsidies funded out of the general treasury are also not captured by the
constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause despite the fact payment of subsidies
could be considered a governmental activity rather than activity of the state as a
participant in the market." The market participant exception and the exception for
certain direct payment subsidies, to the extent it is considered separate from the
market participant exception, require that a distinction be drawn between the types
of state investment attraction incentives offered, specifically between tax and nontax subsidies.' As a result, direct payment subsidies funded out of the general
treasury, supply of infrastructure, provision of low-interest loans, assistance in jobtraining or recruitment, and granting of land are largely immunized from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny.' The exceptions for these types of investment
attraction subsidies are one reason why the dormant Commerce Clause fails to solve
the prisoner's dilemma.
b. Tax Incentives

There exists a degree of uncertainty over exactly which investment attraction tax
incentives would run afoul of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. As noted earlier,

it is clear that a state cannot place a discriminatory sales or use tax on products
produced out-of-state in an effort to force industries to establish facilities within the
state. 33 But what about the typical investment attraction tax incentives used by the
states, such as a sales tax exemption for goods and equipment the attracted
enterprise purchases, property tax abatements on property used by an attracted
enterprise, or income tax credits based on new investment or jobs created?
Professors Hellerstein and Coenen believe that certain Supreme Court pronouncements in the few existing tax incentive cases are broad enough to create
arguments that all these types of tax incentives are illegal.1 34 However, Professors
Hellerstein and Coenen believe that the opinions can and should be more narrowly
read. 35 They suggest that the Court would only strike down a state tax incentive

130. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (direct subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause). However, it may be problematic if
subsidies are not paid out of general revenue funds. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15
(1994) (invalidating subsidy to in-state milk producers paid directly from tax on all sales of milk, including out-ofstate milk, to retailers). Although the Court in West Lynn Creamery states that it has never squarely addressed the
question of direct subsidization, the Court's opinion should not be read as calling into question the general
exemption for direct subsidization, see Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note I, at 837-38. It appears the case would
have turned out differently if the subsidies were paid from general revenue funds rather than the tax on sales of milk
to retailers. See Matthew Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Necessary for International Trade
Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions With Respect to Sub-Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L
& Bus. 609, 616 n. 28 (1996/97).
131. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 1, at 867-70.
132. See id at 855-68 (examining additional types of non-tax subsidies but arguing that they should all be
treated the same, i.e. should generally be exempt from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny). Note that imposition
of downstream restraints by a state when making a purchase or granting a subsidy may run afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause, see South Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
133. See Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
134. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 1, at 802-03; see also Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Tax Incentives, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 57, 58 (1996).
135. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 1, at 804-05.
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provision if it favored in-state over out-of-state activities and if it implicated the
coercive power of the state."36 This second factor would distinguish those incentives
framed as exemptions from or reductions in additional state tax liability to which
the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to engage in targeted
activity within the state versus those incentives affecting a taxpayer's current tax
bill within the state. Results under the test, at least in some instances, turn on
whether the attracted taxpayer has previously engaged in some taxable activity
within the state.'3 7 Under the Hellerstein/Coenen test, income tax credits or
deductions for in-state investment or other activities are invalid."' However,
property tax abatements based on new in-state investments and sales tax exemptions
on property purchased for the construction of new in-state facilities are valid except
if tied to other in-state activity such as job creation or a certain size of enterprise."3
These abatements and exemptions are valid since the state is merely "disclaiming4
the right to impose any taxes on a 'virgin' tax base the state is seeking to attract."' 0
Dormant Commerce Clause restraints utilizing the Hellerstein/Coenen test are
insufficient to resolve the prisoner's dilemma since states may continue to employ
numerous tax incentives. The test has an additional negative consequence. The
Hellerstein/Coenen test would strike down conditions that one finds in new state
"accountability" legislation aimed at attracted enterprises. Accountability
legislation seeks to ensure that the attracted enterprises do in fact add to net tax
revenues by
requiring such entities, for example, to hire a certain number of
4

residents. '

Professor Enrich disagrees to a limited extent with both the positive and
normative aspects of the Hellerstein/Coenen analysis. Enrich notes that the U.S.
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has focused on an antidiscrimination principle. 42 Under the anti-discrimination principle, the court
focuses on the discrimination against out-of-state businesses or interests. For this
reason, a property tax or sales tax abatement is unlikely to be struck down for outof-state businesses are not responsible for these taxes and thus there can be no
discrimination against these businesses.'43 In contrast, a state investment income tax
credit only given for in-state investment could be struck down since it discriminates
against out-of-state business activity.'" In essence, it states you must conduct your
business in-state in order to receive the credit.
However, Professor Enrich argues that Commerce Clause values are broader than
simply discrimination against out-of-state interests. Commerce Clause values, he
argues, are also concerned with distortions caused to the national economy and
balkanization and rivalry between the states. 45 It might, of course, be possible to

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
at 806.
See id at 809.
See id. at 816-20.
See id. at 825-34.
Id. at 809.
See generally, Gilbert, supra note 114.
See Enrich supra note 7, at 422-33.
See id. at 446-47.
See id. at 433-40.
See id. at 448-49.
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dismiss the distortion standard depending on the effects of state incentive wars. The
balkanization/rivalry standard is harder to dismiss, however, because incentive
packages can engender rivalry as seen by the current subsidy wars. In any event,
assuming one or all of these are central concerns of the Commerce Clause, Enrich
proceeds to argue that the focus "should be on whether a particular tax provision
distorts economic decision-making in favor of in-state activity, not whether it treats
in-state and out-of-state actors disparately."'" Under this test, the property tax
abatement is treated the same as the investment tax credit and is illegal. 47 Professor
Enrich encourages courts to review the motive behind the state measure as well as
the degree of distortion caused by the state measures. For example, Professor Enrich
would want a tax credit given to companies for the installation of pollution control
equipment within in-state factories to be upheld because the purpose behind such
a measure is environmental protection and it is unlikely that the measure would
significantly distort investment decisions,' or, in other words be a disguised
investment attraction instrument. The dormant Commerce Clause utilizing the
Enrich test would be somewhat more restrictive of state investment attraction
subsidies than under the Hellerstein/Coenen test and thus somewhat better at
removing states from the prisoner's dilemma. However, it is uncertain which of
these two tests will ultimately prevail and whether courts will have sufficient
opportunity to delineate a clear test due to the lack of plaintiffs.
2. The Lack of Plaintiffs Problem
Professor Enrich argues that so few dormant Commerce Clause cases have dealt
with investment attraction incentives because the typical class of plaintiffs involved
in dormant Commerce Clause have little or no incentive to challenge state
investment attraction incentives. 49 The harms caused by state subsidy wars are not
to interstate businesses. Mobile capital businesses gain a windfall from state
subsidy wars, particularly when they are able to utilize informational advantages
over the states. 50 Instead, the harm from state subsidy wars is caused to state
citizens and taxpayers that receive less public goods or pay higher taxes. Thus,
Enrich is hopeful that states will come forward as plaintiffs to challenge the
investment attraction subsidies granted by other states.' 5 ' Enrich is particularly
hopeful since in many states it is attorney-generals responsible for bringing such
claims and most attorney-generals are elected rather than appointed.'5 2 However,
Professor Enrich is probably overly optimistic. First, recent experience suggests that
state attorneys-general are more concerned with guarding their own state laws than

146. Id. at 456.
at 457-58.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 408-13.
150. On how a business can utilize its informational advantage, see Atik, supra note 30, at 856-58. Because
states often attempt to hide information on bids from one another, businesses are placed at a further advantage in
the negotiations. For instance, Colorado attempted to keep secret some of the details of its bid for the United
Airlines maintainance facility. See James Coates, Incentives Soar in Bidding Warfor United Facility, CHi. TRIB.,
May 9,1991, available in 1991 WL 9377444.
151. See Enrich, supra note 7, at 418-22.
152. See id. at 419 n.215.
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pursuing greater economic efficiency. 53 Second, to the extent an attorney-general
has designs on a larger office dealing with the economy (e.g. Governor), the
attorney-general is unlikely to risk undermining his position on incentives in
advance of an election campaign. Third, the uncertainty over the test a court will
adopt and thus the success of such an action will have a chilling effect on such
challenges.
V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT CONSTRAINTS
States have been subject to international constraints on subsidies since the
conclusion of the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code concluded under the auspices
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, the Tokyo
Round Code had little to no impact on the states because it only contained stringent
obligations with respect to export subsidies and very few constraints on domestic
subsidies.' 55 Moreover, the states were not affected by unilateral countervailing
duties (i.e. additional duties intended to offset subsidization) imposed by other
nations since the United States56was the primary user of countervailing duties during
the 1980's and early 1990,s.1
However, a revised and strengthened subsidies agreement concluded in 1994 as
part of the GATT-sponsored Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations
garnered the attention of state level officials.' 57 Nonetheless, it is likely that the
Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement will have little impact on U.S. state subsidy
wars for investment attraction purposes because the agreement focuses on
international trade effects of state subsidies. As a result, the Subsidies Agreement
is a rather crude device at best for reducing the state investment attraction subsidy
wars.
The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement 5 1 provides for the first time a
definition of "subsidy" within an international agreement. Under article 1, a subsidy
is deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government ... where
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g.
loan guarantees);

153. The State Attorneys-General approach to the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement implementing legislation
is indicative of this emphasis. See, e.g., State Officials to Ask Clintonfor Trade ConsultationSummit, II INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 128 (June 29, 1994).
154. See Matthew Schaefer & Thomas Singer, MultilateralTrade Agreements and U.S. States-An Analysis
of Potential GAIT UruguayRound Agreements, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 31, 47 (1992).
155. See id.
156. See JOHN JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 768 (3d ed.
1995).
157. See KAYNE, supra note 10, at 8 (noting the governors raised the issue during their discussions); Report
of the intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), The Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade
Negotiations 18-21 (Jan. 1994); see also Schaefer & Singer, supra note 154, at 47-53; Charlie Colgan, Brave New
World: International Regulation of Subsidies and the Future of State and Local Economic Development
Programs,9 ECON. DEv. Q. 107 (May 1995).
158. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15. 1994, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1533
[hereinafter Subsidies Agreement].
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(ii) government revenue otherwise due is forgone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure, or purchases goods;
...
and

(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.'59
All major types of state investment attraction subsidies would fall within this
definition. Unlike the dormant Commerce Clause, the Uruguay Round Subsidies
Agreement does not exempt non-tax incentives from its disciplines.
The Subsidies Agreement seeks to constrain only those domestic subsidies that
are "specific," or in other words targeted at or limited to a certain enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries." The Subsidies Agreement borrowed
the concept of specificity from U.S. countervailing duty law. 6 ' Specificity is
considered important because specific subsidies are more likely to be trade
distorting.' 62 Many of the high-profile state investment attraction subsidies are de
facto targeted at a limited number of enterprises as was seen in the Colorado and
Kentucky state supreme court cases above. The agreement does not seek to interfere
with more general government policies not targeted at certain enterprises such as
changes in generally applicable rates of tax. 6 3
Specific subsidies are "actionable" under the agreement if they cause adverse
effects to interests of other members.'" What is meant by the term "actionable"?
Depending on the type of adverse effect caused, a World Trade Organization
(WTO) Member can either impose an additional duty on imported subsidized
products, called a countervailing duty, to counteract the subsidy or it may bring a
WTO dispute settlement case. 65 Under the WTO dispute settlement procedures, a
neutral dispute settlement panel composed of three individuals not representing any
government will determine whether a subsidy is specific and causing adverse
effects.' 66 If the panel finds that a specific subsidy is causing adverse effects, then
a Member is under an obligation to "take appropriate steps to remove the adverse
effects or withdraw the subsidy."' 67 If the subsidizing Member refuses to do so
within six months, then the aggrieved68Member will be authorized by the WTO
membership to take countermeasures.
With respect to U.S. state-level investment attraction subsidies, the relevant
question is how likely will these subsidies cause adverse effects to other WTO
nations? Article 5 of the agreement defines adverse effects to include the following:

159. See id.
160. See id. arts. 2 & 5.
161. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 296.
162. See HUFBAUER & SHELTON-ERB, supra note 6, at 11.
163. See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 158, art. 2. Similarly, the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), another major Uruguay Round agreement, does not interfere with state unitary income taxes or
corresponding apportionment formulas. See Schaefer, supra note 130, at 641.
164. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 158, art. 5.
165. See id. arts. 7 & l0.
166. See id.art. 7.
167. Id. art. 7.8.
168. Id. art. 7.9.
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a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member;
b) nullification or impairment of benefits [such as tariff concessions] accruing
directly or indirectly to other Members ...;
c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.'"
Countervailing duties can only be imposed in response to the first type of adverse
effect, namely injury to a domestic industry. A WTO case can be brought based on
allegations of any of the three adverse effects. The adverse effect of serious
prejudice provides the greatest potential constraint on state investment attraction
subsidies, however, as the analysis below will reveal it is unlikely state subsidies
will be complained of under the serious prejudice criteria.
Under article 6 of the agreement, serious prejudice will be deemed to exist in the
case of:
a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeding 5 per cent;
b) subsidies covering operating losses sustained by an industry;
c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than onetime measures which are non-recurrent ...; or
d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and
grants to cover debt-repayment. 70
Most, if not all, U.S. state investment attraction subsidies will fail to meet this
criteria. First, state programs are unlikely to meet the 5% ad valorem figure for a
product. State subsidies granted to producers of a certain product can be aggregated
and then divided by total national production. 17 Many U.S. state investment
attraction subsidies are given to industries with significant national production, such
as automobiles, including the well-know examples of Southern states attracting
BMW, Mercedes, and Toyota plants. It is unlikely that total ad valorem
subsidization when spread out over time will reach these levels. It will, of course,
be more likely where investment attraction incentives have been granted to the same
industry by many states and where total national production of the product is
relatively small. The same conclusion can be drawn if subsidies to a specific firm
or enterprise are considered. The 5% threshold is unlikely to be met in many
instances because, as noted before, many state subsidies are granted to enterprises
with significant production. States granting investment incentives should be more
concerned with paragraph four in Annex IV to the agreement that presumes serious
prejudice if the recipient firm is in "a start up situation" and the overall rate of
subsidization exceeds 15% of the total funds invested." It is possible that the large
subsidies granted by certain states to attract new automobile plants would meet this
criteria. 17 Second, state investment attraction incentives are also unlikely to meet

169. Id. art. 5 (a)(b) & (c).
170. See id. art. 6.
171. See id. annex IV, pam. 6.
172. See Brewer & Young, supra note 11, at 188-89.
173. See id at 182. While the chart in this article appears to indicate that the 15% threshold would be met
for Alabama's wooing of Mercedes and South Carolina's package for BMW from the figures given, the situation
is actually not so clear. First, it is unclear from the chart over what time the states' incentives occur. Second, if the
incentives are in the form of low-interest loans, the magnitude of the subsidy connected with the loans will only
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the other three criteria for presumed serious prejudice. Such subsidies are generally
not granted to cover operating losses nor do they generally include direct
forgiveness of government-held debt.
The Subsidies Agreement also gives examples of situations in which serious
prejudice may arise although it is not presumed. First, serious prejudice may arise
when the subsidy displaces or impedes the "imports of a like product of another
Member into the market of the subsidizing member."' 74 Where competitions are
merely between states and not foreign entities, state investment attraction subsidies
are unlikely to have this effect if the entity already resides or is only considering an
investment in the United States. For example, state subsidy wars over BMW,
Mercedes and Toyota cannot be considered as impeding auto imports from the
European Community, of which Germany is a member, or Japan. These automobile
manufacturers were going to invest in the United States, the only question being
which state. Second, serious prejudice may also arise when the subsidy displaces
or impedes "the exports of a like product of another Member from a third country
market."' 75 However, unless the attracted entity exports its product, it cannot
possibly impede exports of a WTO member to a third country market. If the
subsidized entity does not export, it is also impossible for another Member to
impose countervailing duties on the product produced by the attracted entity.
Lastly, the Subsidies Agreement gives a "green light" to certain subsidy
programs.1 76 "Green-light" subsidies generally cannot be complained about by
another Member in a WTO dispute settlement case nor can another Member place
a countervailing duty to offset such subsidization."7 The three categories of "green
light" subsidies are for research and development, assistance to disadvantaged
regions, and assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new
environmental requirements. 7 Each of these "green light" subsidies is subject to
detailed limits, however. For example, the environmental category can only be a
one-time non-recurring measure that is limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation. 79
The research and development category only covers assistance of up to 75% of the
costs of industrial research and 50% of the costs of pre-competitive development
activity.' It is unclear whether the disadvantaged regions category is really an
exemption since such programs must be non-specific within the meaning of the

be a small percentage of the entire loan amount. Specifically, the magnitude of the subsidy would be the difference
in interest payable at market rates versus at the rate offered by the government or perhaps even be smaller if
measured as the cost to the government rather than the benefit to the recipient. See Subsidies Agreement, supra
note 158, annex IV,para. 1 (indicating that cost to the government is the proper measure).
174. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 158, art. 6.3.
175. Id.
176. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, Vol. IL904-05, 951-52 (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993). The reference to "green-light" refers to the negotiators "traffic-light" approach to negotiations.
Prohibited subsidies, such as export subsidies, are "red-light." Those subsidies that are potentially actionable are
"yellow-light." See also Colgan, supra note 157, at 109; Brewer & Young, supra note 11, at 188.
177. See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 158, art. 8. The reason I use the word "generally" in the text is
that subsidies qualifying for one of the "green light" categories are still subject to challenge if they cause serious
adverse effects. See id. art. 9.
178. See id art. 8.2.
179. See id. art. 8.2(c).
180. See id. art. 8.2(a).
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agreement and thus would not be actionable in any event.' (My educated hunch
is that negotiators wanted to emphasize that such programs were not actionable,
particularly in light of the definition of specificity in early drafts of the Subsidies
Agreement that made all sub-federal government subsidies specific)." 2
By focusing on international trade effects, the Subsidies Agreement is likely to
do little to curb state subsidy wars for investment attraction. Concerns over state
investment attraction subsidy wars focus less on trade effects than on the reduction
in public goods and/or the increased tax burdens placed upon the general
population. The conclusion that the Subsidies Agreement will have little impact on
state subsidy programs receives some tentative support from empirical data-no
state subsidy has been complained of in a WTO dispute settlement case in the first
three years of the agreement's operation. Other limitations of the agreement further
buttress the early empirical data. First, the agreement potentially suffers from a
"plaintiff problem" with respect to state investment attraction subsidies. Only WTO
member nations can complain of subsidies granted in violation of the agreement.'
They may refuse to complain of U.S. subsidy practice if they believe they could be
exposed to a similar case. Indeed, exposure of other countries is greater than U.S.
exposure since foreign governments generally use subsidies to a greater degree than
governments in the United States. 84 Some nations allow private producers to
formally petition their government to bring a WTO complaint.'8 5 In other nations,
private companies can place informal pressure on their government to bring a WTO
case. However, in some instances foreign producers will be hesitant to do so since
they may benefit from the subsidies. For instance, one cannot imagine Toyota
petitioning the Japanese government to bring a complaint against the United States
for investment attraction subsidies granted to auto manufacturers by U.S. states.
Second, the potential impact of the Subsidies Agreement is further limited because
it applies to goods only. 116 Therefore, those state investment attraction subsidies
granted to service enterprises, such as the Colorado offer to United Airlines for the
building of a maintenance facility, will fall entirely outside of its coverage.
Are there any other international agreements on the horizon that might solve the
prisoner's dilemma confronting U.S. states? A Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) is currently being negotiated within the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), comprised of twenty-nine
nations, most of which are developed nations."8 7 While the negotiations will not be
concluded at the earliest until sometime in 1998, it appears that the agreement will

181. See id. art. 8.2(b).
182. Regarding early drafts of the Subsidies Agreement with respect to sub-national subsidies, see Schaefer
& Singer,supra note 154, at 48 (commenting on Art 2.2 of the Dunkel Draft Uruguay Round Agreement that made
all sub-federal subsidies "specific."); Stewart, supra note 176, at 953-54 (noting Canadian objections to art. 2.2
of the Dunkel Draft).
183. No actions can be brought against the states in U.S. federal or state courts for violation of the Subsidies
Agreement except by the U.S. federal government. See Uruguay Round Agreements Implementing Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 8, 1994) § 102 (c.); see also Schaefer, supra note 130, at 639-42.
184. See Colgan, supra note 157, at 115.
185. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
186. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) envisions future negotiations to limit subsidies
with respect to service providers. See GATS, April 15, 1994, 33 LLM. 1167, 1179 (1994), art. XV.
187. See Grant D. Aldonas, MultilateralInvestment Agreements, 31 INT'L LAW. 447 (1997).
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do little to curb investment incentives. First, it appears that most tax measures will
be excluded fromthe agreement.' Second, it appears that no more than a national
treatment obligation will apply to investment incentives. 9 The national treatment
obligation would simply require that any investment incentives be available on
equal terms to foreign investors and U.S. domestic investors. Third, the agreement
will likely allow nations to list reservations for sub-federal measures.'" ° Thus, there
is little possibility that the MAI will solve the prisoner's dilemma fueling state
investment attraction subsidy wars.' 9'
VI. APPROACHES TO SUBSIDIES IN OTHER DIVIDED-POWER SYSTEMS
Are there any solutions or models from other federal systems that the United
States could borrow from? The U.S. states are not the only entities within a common
market that are engaged in subsidy wars. Canadian provinces continue to engage in
investment attraction subsidy wars, although there has been an effort to curb such
wars through a recent Internal Trade Agreement. Member nations of European
Community (EC) realized at its formation that subsidies could threaten the common
market, and therefore, the EC's "constitution" contains limits on "state aids."
A.

Canada'sInternal TradeAgreement

1. The Approach
Canada continues to face significant barriers to inter-provincial trade and the
establishment of a common market due to the lack of any equivalent to the dormant
Commerce Clause within the Canadian Constitution and the significant spheres of
exclusive authority retained by the provinces."9 Thus, in 1994, the Canadian federal
government and the provinces negotiated an Internal Trade Agreement (ITA) in
order to "reduce and eliminate, to the extent possible, barriers to the free movement
of persons, goods, services, and investments within Canada [and to] promote an
open, efficient and stable domestic market."' 93 One of the types of provincial
measures addressed by the agreement is investment attraction subsidies.
Article 608 of the 1TA requires that incentives be given on a non-discriminatory
basis to enterprises owned or controlled by an investor of another province or that
maintains its head office in another province. 19 4 This is similar to the national
treatment obligation that will likely be created within the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment being negotiated within the OECD. A Code of Conduct on Incentives
is appended to the 1TA obligations regarding investment. The Code of Conduct

188. See Negotiatorson OECD Investment Pact to Meet with 30 Developing Countries, 14 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1556, 1557 (September 17, 1997).
189. See Brewer & Young, supra note 11, at 191-92.
190. See Aldonas, supra note 187, at 451.
191. Other existing regional international agreements also fail to curb investment incentives. See Brewer &
Young, supra note 11, at 192-93.
192. See Schaefer, supra note 9, at 462.
193. Agreement on Internal Trade, July 1994, Preamble (last modified Nov. 20, 1995)
<http://xinfo.ic.gc.ca/ic-data/economy/intemal.trade/toc-eng.hm>> [hereinafter ITA].
194. See id. art. 608.
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defines "incentive" broadly to include tax reductions aimed at a specific enterprise
as well as "contribution[s] with a financial value that confers a benefit on the
recipient, including cash grants, loans, debt guarantees or an equity injection, made
Therefore, like the Subsidies Agreement, the Canadian
on preferential terms .
ITA covers both tax and non-tax subsidies. The Code of Conduct prohibits a
province from providing an "incentive that is, in law or in fact, contingent on, and
would directly result in, an enterprise located in the territory of any other [province]
relocating an existing operation to its territory." 1 This is one of the few obligations
9
in the Code subject to the formal dispute settlement mechanism of the agreement."
Under the dispute settlement mechanism a neutral panel composed of five persons
shall rule on conformity with the Code. 9 ' However, the Code makes an explicit
exception to the prohibition for instances in which the enterprise was considering
relocation outside of Canada."9 Also significant is the fact that the prohibition does
not cover instances of the expansion of existing enterprises and new investment.
With respect to expansions and new investments, the Code only contains a "soft
law" obligation on provinces to "endeavor to refrain from engaging in bidding wars
to attract prospective investors."' Moreover, the Code recognizes that economic
development programs of the provinces "may include provision of incentives,"
although the provinces are to "take into account the economic interests of other
[provinces] in developing and applying their incentive measures."20" Neither of
these latter obligations is subject to dispute settlement. 2°2 Rather, a province is only
entitled to request information on incentives offered by other provinces and to
request consultations with other provinces if it suspects an unwise bidding war is
underway. 32° A working party established by the agreement is to collect data and
issue a report on incentives annually.'
2. Is the Approach Effective?
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Internal Trade Agreement,
although the conceptual weaknesses in the approach give reasons to doubt whether
it will in fact prove to be highly effective. Indeed, the premier of the province of
British Columbia recently refused to vote for a strengthening of the ITA with
respect to all inter-provincial trade barriers because of the ineffectiveness of
5
controlling "poaching" of British Columbia businesses by other provinces."
Additionally, Canadian officials generally believe that the working group created
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will not have sufficient resources or investigatory power to sufficiently examine
investment incentives. 2'
B.

The European Community's "Constitution"

1. The Approach
The European Community control on "state aids" is of a "constitutional" nature.
The treaties forming the European Community, often referred to as the EC
"constitution," provide the substantive limits on "state aids" as well as a central
enforcement mechanism. The term "state aids" has been broadly defined to include
both spending and taxation measures.' 7
Article 92 section 1 of the Treaty of Rome as amended provides the general limit
on state subsidies:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a member-state or
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between member-states, be
incompatible with the common market. °8
Article 92 incorporates the notion of specificity found in the Uruguay Round
Subsidies Agreement.' Article 92 section 2 specifies limited types of aid that are
compatible with the common market, most importantly, social aid granted to
individual consumers that does not discriminate on the basis of the origin of
products, and aid in response to natural disasters. 1 0 Article 92 section 3 elaborates
certain types of aid that "may be considered to be compatible with the common
market."21' This category includes aid to disadvantaged regions (i.e. those regions
with low standards of living or high unemployment). The general prohibition as
well as many of the exemptions and possible exemptions display the focus of EC
constraints on trade effects between member states. Investment incentive aids will
generally be captured because to the extent that investment decisions have been
distorted, trade between the member states has necessarily been affected.
A distinguishing feature of state aid control in the EC is its centralized
enforcement mechanism."' Under article 93, member states are under an obligation
to notify the EC Commission, generally regarded as the Executive Branch of the EC
government, of any plans to grant state aid.21 3' Article 93 also prohibits a member
206. See Trebilcock & Behboodi, supra note 2, at 56.
207. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aids Under European Community Competition Law, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 410, 433 (1994); Ileana Simplicean-Stroia, Comment, Study of the State Aid Policy in the European
Community: The "Illegal" State Aid Problem, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STuD. 87, 93 (1997).
208. Ehlerman, supra note 207, at 412 n.8 (quoting Treaty Establishingthe European Community, Feb. 7,
1992, art. 92 (1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]).
209. See The UruguayRound of MultilateralTrade Negotiations,supra note 157, at 19.
210. See Ehlerman, supra note 207, at 412 n.9 (quoting EC Treaty art. 92 (2)).
211. Id at 413 n.10 (quoting Treaty Establishingthe European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
92 (3), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I)) (emphasis added).
212. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aid Control in the European Union: Success or Failure?, 18
FORDHAM IN'L LJ. 1212, 1216-17 (1995).
213. See Simplicean-Storia, supra note 207, at 97.
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state from implementing an aid program until the Commission has reviewed the aid
program and made a decision under article 92 as to whether the aid is compatible
with the common market.2"4 However, the Commission has not attempted to recover
aid that a member state fails to notify.2" 5 Instead, it has reviewed such unnotified aid
21 6
to determine whether it is compatible with the common market. However, private
parties are able to challenge the granting of unnotified and unreviewed state aid
before national courts.21 7 If the EC Commission finds that the proposed state aid is
incompatible with the common market, then it orders the state to abolish or alter the
aid program.21 8 If a state does not comply with the decision, the EC Commission or
another state may go before the European Court of Justice to have the state action
annulled.
2. Is the Approach Effective?
The EC approach to state aids, and in particular its enforcement mechanisms,
although in theory stronger than those in federations of the United States and
Canada, is still subject to extensive criticism. Member states continue to grant state
aids without notifying such aid and/or in the absence of Commission review of the
aids' compatibility with the common market.21 9 The Commission itself reports that
0
30% of aid it reviews is aid that member states failed to notify.' However, the
majority of aid under review is notified and a considerable amount of unnotified aid
is ultimately subject to review by the Commission.
VII. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE U.S.
PROBLEM OF STATE SUBSIDY WARS
A. The Needfor FederalLegislation to Limit State Subsidy Wars and
PotentialObjections to Such a Solution
Competition officials in the European Community wonder how federations, such
as the United States, are able to function without constraints on subsidies used by
sub-federal governments. 22' However, the United States and Canadian federations
do not function as well as they could due to the lack of constraints on subsidy wars.
The lack of constraints may lead to the provision of less public goods, higher taxes
on non-subsidized entities, and/or distortion in the efficient allocation of resources.
The effort to deal with subsidies in the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement, albeit
in a relatively weak manner, and the failed efforts between U.S. states to constrain
themselves bears witness to this fact. Federal legislation and enforcement capability
will be required to solve the prisoner's dilemma causing state investment attraction
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subsidy wars.222 Federal legislation as opposed to an interstate compact is more
likely since such legislation will not require unanimous consent of all states in order
to be enacted. Numerous objections or concerns might be raised with respect to
such a solution. However, the objections ultimately do not argue against a federal
legislative solution but rather inform the shape of such legislation. In particular, the
objections may influence the federal legislation's substantive constraints and
enforcement mechanism.
Objection #1: "Federal Legislation Limiting State Subsidy Wars Is Politically
Unfeasible, if
Not Utterly Impossible": While such legislation will likely be difficult
to pass in the current political climate, prisoner's dilemma-type situations are
appropriate situations for federal intervention. Indeed, certain federal legislation
already seeks to limit the use offederal funds by states for relocation incentives.223
The proposed legislation would go beyond the current legislation to limit the use of
state funds for relocation incentives. Any such legislation would need to be
"packaged" with federal legislation returning power to the states on other matters.
There are strong indications that states are seeking an overall reassessment of the
relationship between the federal and state governments. Such a reassessment may
lead to conclusions that the federal government is active in certain areas without
proper justification. However, this reassessment process should also ask the other
question: Are there areas in which the federal government should be active but
currently is not? The prisoner's dilemma causing state subsidy wars is such an area.
Objection #2: "Since State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Are Not a New
Phenomenon, Why Is There a Need To Enact Limits at This Point in Our Country's
History?": It is true that state investment attraction subsidies date back to the
beginning of our country. In 179 1, the state of New Jersey gave a tax exemption for
an manufacturing facility owned by Alexander Hamilton.2' However, as mentioned
before, the recent efforts by state officials themselves to limit the subsidy wars,
albeit failed efforts, give at least some indication that the problem is worsening.225
Moreover, since these subsidy programs are distortive and/or wasteful, there is no
reason to let the situation persist indefinately.
Objection # 3: "The New 'Accountability' Legislation Enacted by States Will Cure
the Problem of State 'Giveaways'":226 It is true that accountability legislation
reduces the chances that the subsidy a state offers will exceed the extra social
benefits the state acquires as a result of the attracted enterprise. However, such

222. For other articles calling for such legislation, see Melvin Burstein & Arthur Rolnick, Congress Should
End the Economic War Among the States, 10 STATE TAX NOTES 1895 (1996); Taylor, supra note 1,at 670.
223. See Gilbert, supra note 114, at 443-44.
224. See id.at 428.
225. Several commentators believe the problem is worsening. See Brunori, supra note 13, at 1732; Collins
& Watson, supra note 14, at 12 (claiming that subsidy wars have escalated exponentially); John Hood, "AntiFreeze: Stop the State Bidding Wars for Big Business," POL'Y REV. 62,64 (Spring 1994) (reviewing the history
and noting that many business analysts date the opening salvo of the modem bidding wars to 1976).
226. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 114, at 429 (considering accountability measures as an alternative to other
approaches to solving state subsidy wars, including federal legislation); Graham Toft, Doing Battle over the
Incentives War: Improve Accountability butAvoid Federal 'Noncopete' Mandates, 10 STATE TAX NoTES 1901,
1902 (1996).
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legislation does not guarantee that states will properly measure externalities. More
importantly, bidding wars still lead to much, if not all, of the extra social benefits
being transferred to the attracted enterprise. Thus, even in an era of increased
accountability legislation, the states would be better off with limits placed on
investment attraction subsidies.
Objection # 4: "The Federal Government May Lack the Competence To Enact
Legislation Limiting State Subsidy Wars": As a result of recent Supreme Court
federalism jurisprudence, there may be some concern as to whether the federal
government maintains the constitutional capacity to enact such legislation. First, the
Court in United States v. Lopez 7 announced that Congress could not regulate noncommercial activities that merely have some indirect impact on interstate
commerce. However, the connection of state subsidies to interstate commerce is not
so attenuated as to fall within the Lopez rationale, even if one acknowledges that
incentive packages have only a small influence on locational decisions of
businesses. Second, regulation of subsidies does not run afoul of the Court's
holding in New York v. United States228 that the Congress cannot commandeer a
state legislature to enact a federal regulatory program. Lastly, the market participant
and subsidy exceptions to the dormant Cimmerce Clause do not apply to federal
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause power.229 Thus, the federal
government has the constitutional competence to enact legislation limiting state
subsidy wars.23°
Objection # 5: "Monitoringand Enforcing the Limits Will Necessitate Creatinga
Huge Federal Bureaucracy":231 Obviously, the administrative costs of federal
monitoring and enforcement should be taken into account. Indeed, it should be a
clear goal that administrative costs should not outweigh nor even approach the net
benefits to states of enacting the limits. This indicates that the substantive limits
should not be overly aggressive. It might also be possible to shift some federal
agency personnel from activities for which there is less justification for federal
involvement. In other words, creation of monitoring and enforcement capability
regarding state investment attraction subsidies does not necessitate an overall
increase in the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, while this article supports a
federal agency enforcement mechanism, one could rely on existing judicial
infrastructure or attempt to constrain state subsidy wars through use of the federal
tax code if administrative cost projections are too high.232

227. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
228. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
229. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986). A later case distinguishing Gould
found no Congressional intent to pre-empt the state proprietary activity at issue in the case but did not find that
Congress lacked authority to limit state spending measures. See Building & Constr. Trust Council v. Massachusetts
Water Resources Bd., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
230. See Matthew Schaefer, The Impact (If Any) ofRecent Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence on the
Negotiationand Enforcement of International Trade Agreements Aug. 25, 1997 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); Philip Frickey, The Congressional Process and the Constitutionality of Federal Legislation to End
the Economic War Among the States, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 53 (1996).
231. 1derive this objection from Taylor, supra note 1, at 706-07 (ultimately favoring a bureaucratic solution,
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Objection # 6: "Legislation Limiting State Subsidies Will Lead to Unilateral
Disarmament in the International Context": The European Community (EC)
maintains concerns in this regard with respect to its "constitutional" limits on states
aids. For this reason, the EC has sought to "export" or internationalize their subsidy
disciplines. 3 Unilateral disarmament vis-a-vis foreign trading partners was also a
concern of the Canadian provinces during the negotiation of the Internal Trade
Agreement (ITA). Thus, the ITA contains an exception to its disciplines on
relocation subsidies when the entity is considering a location outside of Canada.
Quite naturally, unilateral disarmament vis-a-vis foreign competitors should be a
concern when drafting U.S. federal legislation. The legislation might reduce this
concern in several ways. For instance, the federal agency responsible for
enforcement might be given discretion to waive penalties in those instances in
which a state was competing against a foreign jurisdiction for an enterprise.
However, the federal agency should also consider in such an instance whether the
state subsidy is consistent with the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement.
Objection # 7: "Why Attempt To DraftLegislationLimiting Subsidies Since It Will
Be Impossible To Elaboratethe CorrectStandard?"?' As discussed previously,
the ideal system of constraint on state subsidies is to allow only the state with the
greatest externalities to bid and then only to the extent of the externality
difference.235 Unfortunately, due to problems in choosing a single methodology for
measuring externalities and the administrative costs of applying elaborate
measurement methodologies, it is unlikely that a federal agency could be charged
with enforcing such a standard, at least intitially. (The federal agency could be
charged with developing such a methodology over time). Without an established
methodology, agency decisions would risk being "politicized." Instead, one must
attempt to craft standards that serve as rough correlatives for this ideal approach.
Naturally, there is a risk that the standard created will be overly broad. This
objection indicates that one should take a cautious approach in elaborating a
standard. However, it is not a reason for refusing to enact any limits.
Objection # 8: "Federal Legislation Limiting State Subsidy Wars Will Unduly
Interfere with State Autonomy": Sub-federal experimentation and innovation is a
central policy reason for the creation of federations.2" Thus, some might worry that
federal legislation limiting subsidies will unduly interfere with state autonomy to
experiment in the economic development area. However, federations do not allow
for unbridled autonomy of sub-federal governments. This is why constitutional
limits, such as the dormant Commerce Clause, are placed on sub-federal
government actions. Even with constraints placed on subsidy wars, states will
maintain much flexibility to innovate with respect to economic development,

under dormant Commerce Clause); Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 222, at 1900; Taylor, supra note 1,at 704-08.
233. Ehlennann, supra note 212, at 1219-20 (noting EC interest in "exporting" state aid control).
234. I derived this objection from Trebilcock & Behboodi, supra note 2, at 55-58 (displaying skepticism that

a manageable set of rules could be developed in the Canadian context because the "range of scenarios seems likely
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235. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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including education and training programs, infrastructure development, and even
generally applicable tax rates and policies. Eliminating the investment attraction
subsidy wars will free resources for other state programs (or allow state tax cuts to
broad segments of the population).2 37
B.

The Shape of the ProposedFederalLegislation

1. Principles Regarding Substantive Constraints
The federal legislation's substantive constraints can be based upon principles
drawn from international approaches and approaches in other divided power
systems. Such legislation can also give recognition to the underlying principles in
state constitutional law constraints.
1) A Broad Definition of Subsidy Should Be Adopted: The WTO Subsidies
Agreement, Canada's Internal Trade Agreement, and the European Community's
"constitution," all incorporate a broad definition of subsidy that includes both tax
and non-tax measures.23 Such a broad definition is necessary in order to avoid
merely shifting the types of subsidies used by states for attracting investment. The
dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, at best, limits tax-related
incentives. While some find this distinction justified due to the greater political
limits on subsidies in the form of spending measures as opposed to tax breaks," 9 the
current subsidy war includes ready use of both types of subsidies and strongly
suggests that a limit on only tax breaks would be insufficient to end the subsidy war.
2) Targeted Subsidies Should Be Constrained:Subsidies targeted at a particular
enterprise or a limited class of businesses should be subject to maximum allowable
ceilings. Again, in an ideal state of affairs, only the state with the greatest
externalities should be allowed to bid and then only to the extent its externality
exceeds those of other bidders. However, because it is likely to take time to develop
some consensus on an agreed methodology for measuring and comparing
externalities, targeted subsidies should have a cap placed on them. This will ensure
that not all the extra social benefits are shifted to the attracted enterprise. To the
extent externalities do not differ significantly among states, then the criteria is not
far removed from the ideal state of affairs.
3) More General Subsidies Illegal Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Should
Continue To Be Illegal: Non-targeted, general subsidies illegal under the
Hellerstein/Coenen or the Enrich dormant Commerce Clause analysis should not be
immunized from challenge by the statute. Therefore, at a minimum, the statute
should state that it is not approving of any state subsidies that would otherwise be
illegal under the dormant Commerce Clause. Such a statement will guard against
arguments that the statute is giving approval for such subsidies by failing to prohibit
them. While such arguments are likely to fail, since the Court generally requires
explicit approval to remove a state practice from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny, it is still safer to foreclose such argumentation altogether. A bolder version
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of the legislation might seek to eliminate any uncertainty surrounding dormant
Commerce Clause constraints by explicitly prohibiting subsidies that would run
afoul of either the Hellerstein/Coenen or Enrich test.
4) "Green-light" Categoriesof Subsidies Should Be Developed: Certain categories
of subsidies should be exempt from restrictions drawing on the "green-light"
subsidies of the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement. Alternatively, one might also
draw upon Professor Enrich's distinction under the dormant Commerce Clause
between subsidies for investment attraction purposes and those for an
environmental or other non-trade or investment distorting purposes. Indeed, one
might combine the two approaches by formulating "green-light" categories that will
be presumed not to have an investment attraction purpose.
Accordingly, a central exemption should cover assistance to disadvantaged
regions. Such an exception likely makes good policy since such regions will likely
have greater social benefits connected with new investment than non-disadvantaged
regions. Additionally, to the extent operational costs are higher in such regions, the
subsidies are less likely to have trade effects since the subsidization will, at least in
part, simply compensate business for the higher costs. However, such programs
could not be targeted at only a limited class of enterprises. This reduces the chances
of political influence in the measurement of externalities. One might even consider
allowing certain "accountability" provisions in state subsidy programs for
disadvantaged regions, some of which might be illegal under the Hellerstein/Coenen
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. For instance, a state might be allowed to base
the amount of subsidy granted to enterprises within a distressed region on the
amount of persons they hire within the distressed region. A research and
development subsidy exemption also makes sense since the market itself may not
lead to the optimal amount of research and development activity.24°
2. Principles Regarding Enforcement Mechanisms
The weaknesses of current U.S. domestic constraints as well as the approaches
in Canada and the European Community suggest that an effective monitoring and
enforcement mechanism should be established by the legislation. The model below
emphasizes a bureaucratic federal agency solution rather than a judicial solution,
at least initially.24 The bureaucratic solution is preferred initially for several
reasons. First, the relevant federal agency is in a better position than judges to take
into account unilateral disarmament concerns in the international context when
applying the standards. Second, recent l1th Amendment Supreme Court
jurisprudence would require any private cause of action against a State granting a
subsidy in conflict with the federal legislation to be heard in state courts, at least as
an initial matter.242 State court judges may still view themselves as in a prisoner's
dilemma even when applying the federal legislative constraints rather than state
constitutional constraints. Third, private parties have not shown a great interest in
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challenging state subsidy programs under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Therefore, it is uncertain whether private parties would be active plaintiffs if the
federal legislation granted them a private cause of action. Fourth, a federal agency
can ensure uniformity of decisions better than numerous state courts (even if the
Supreme Court would have an opportunity to review such decisions). Clearly, one
of the drawbacks with the bureaucratic solution is the possibility of "capture" of the
agency by special interest groups benefiting from state subsidy wars or the
possibility of "politicized" decision-making. However, allowing limited judicial
review of agency determinations will minimize these concerns. Principles regarding
monitoring and enforcement follow below:
1) NotificationRequirement:All state subsidy programs above a certain level and/or
not generally available should be notified to a designated federal agency. While
compliance with a similar obligation within the European Community context is far
from perfect, many programs are notified. One issue that will require attention is
whether to make notifications public. Some may argue that making notifications
public will give information away to foreign trading partners for possible WTO
challenges.
2) Federal Agency Review: A federal agency should be charged with receiving
notifications and reviewing subsidy programs for conformance with statutory
prohibitions. The agency might also issue regulations further detailing constraints
set out in a "framework" statute passed by Congress. Agency determinations would
be subject to judicial review.
3) Create Effective Penaltiesfor Failure To Notify orfor Granting Subsidies in
Violation of Substantive Constraints:Numerous penalties might be considered to
deter state violations, including withholding federal funds, ordering recovery of the
alleged subsidy, or imposing a fine collectable by the federal government in a suit
against the violating state. However, each of the penalties is surrounded by potential
constitutional complications. For instance, Supreme Court jurisprudence may
require that the federal funds conditioned on compliance with the federal legislation
limiting subsidies be related to the federal interest in enacting the legislation.243 In
any event, the penalty or combination of penalties should be effective. Eliminating
the prisoner's dilemma requires an enforcement mechanism that gives a state an
assurance that other states will comply with the agreement as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In an effort to attract investment, U.S. states are engaged in wasteful and/or
distortive investment attraction subsidy wars. States justify these subsidies as
correcting for an externality. Specifically, states argue that investment attraction
subsidies lead to a net increase in state revenues because of the economic
"multiplier" effects associated with the attracted enterprises. However, there are
reasons to be suspicious of state measurements of externalities. Moreover, the
subsidy wars result in most or all of the additional social benefits associated with
the attracted enterprise being shifted to that enterprise. Yet, the wars continue
because states (and their politicians) are confronted with a prisoner's dilemma-type
243. See South Carolina v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
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situation. Each state would be better off if its ability to grant investment attraction
subsidies was limited. However, no state or individual state official wants to
unilaterally disarm and incur the resulting "heavy sentence."
State constitutional constraints cannot remove states from the prisoner's
dilemma. Indeed, state court interpretations of state constitutional constraints are
influenced by the prisoner's dilemma since state constitutional constraints lead to
unilateral disarmament. Existing interstate, federal and international devices also
fail to solve the prisoner's dilemma that confronts the states. Non-binding
agreements between the states have failed for lack of an effective enforcement
mechanism. Federal constitutional constraints fail for several reasons, including the
lack of interested plaintiffs and the exemptions for many types of state investment
attraction subsidies. International agreements fail because they focus on the
international rather than domestic effects of state subsidies and suffer "plaintiff
problems." The prisoner's dilemma will not be easily resolved. However,
experience with existing U.S. constraints as well as approaches of other
"federations," indicate that federal legislation providing a central enforcement
mechanism is likely the best solution. While there are many possible objections to
such a solution, the federal legislation can be shaped in a fashion that sharply
reduces the force of these objections.

